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Paul Nizan: Conspiracy and the Contemplation of Crime 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Paul Nizan (1905-1940) is also known in France as the ‘impossible communist’, 
for his long-term allegiance to the Party and the abrupt cancellation of his 
membership, in the late 1930s, following the Nazi-Soviet pact. This paper 
discusses a number of his writings, focusing particularly on his best known 
novel, The Conspiracy, where a revolutionary cell plans illegal political action. 
Conflict, nihilism, suicide and betrayal are among the topics stemming from the 
novel, which will be examined from a criminological perspective. The analysis 
will primarily address ‘cultural’ aspects of crime and refer to notions such as 
‘thrill’ and ‘seductions of crime’ among others. These notions, it will be argued, 
require some revision in the face of the imagined or actual criminality described 
in the novel.  
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Introduction 
 
Fiction can be used as a tool for the communication of sociological meaning and 
the elaboration of criminological analysis. A legendary figure in criminology, 
Howard Becker (1995), after leaving us his magnificent legacy around the 
‘labeling of outsiders, has studied the social and ideological aspects of literature. 
He was fascinated by how the boundaries between academic disciplines can be 
made permeable and fuzzy, as was the author he studied, Antonio Candido, who 
resisted specialization and mixed imagination and observation, science and art. 
Some authors have left legal for literary studies to build explanatory bridges 
between the mentalities of law and fiction (Dolin, 2000). Others have simply 
used fiction to discuss sociological and criminological notions while ‘telling 
stories’ (Dow, 1980; Ruggiero, 2003; Forti, Mazzucato and Visconti, 2012).  
   Encouragement to ‘take stories seriously’ may emerge from the reading of  
Aristotle (1995) Poetics, where we find that the difference between a historian 
and a poet is not that one writes prose and the other verse. The real difference, in 
Aristotle’s view, is that the former tells what happened, while the latter what 
might happen. For this reason poetry, and for that matter fiction, are more 
scientific and serious than history, as they tend to give general truths, whereas 
history only gives particular facts. By general truth, Aristotle meant the sort of 
thing that certain types of people will do or say, either probably or necessarily 
(Bull, 2013). Giambattista Vico (1999) echoes this view, when he equates fiction 
to the verisimile, namely an ideal truth that conforms to the common sense of all 
citizens.   
    Fictional characters populate our world and our mind, but they need our 
solicitude, in the sense that we need to ‘take them in’, and ‘if we don’t appreciate 
them, they risk disappearing altogether’ (Latour, 2013: 242). They have this 
peculiarity, then: they become objectively existing beings when we encounter 
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them and reprise them though our subjectivity. In brief, we complement with our 
creative work that performed by their creator. Fiction, therefore, is a 
communicative event bringing people together and eliciting in them the need to 
weigh, discuss and compare values. This paper is an attempt to do exactly that 
while analyzing some of Paul Nizan’s work.  
 
Conflict 
 
Paul Nizan, a friend and classmate of Jean-Paul Sartre, studies classics and 
philosophy at the École Normale Supérieure. At twenty-two he joins the 
Communist Party while starting his career as a novelist, essayist, polemicist, 
literary critic and political journalist (Rubin Suleiman, 2005). Sartre is often  
mistaken for Nizan and congratulated for the books written by the latter. The 
two, however, share the view that teaching humanities is teaching the big 
mistakes of the past (Sartre, 1938). First fascinated by Calvinism, although not 
believing in god, Nizan is attracted to protestant ‘morality’ and to communism in 
equal measure and reaches celebrity with his very first book, (Aden, Arabie) at 
the age twenty-six. In this book, he describes relationships of domination in all 
their nakedness, and in the undisguised colonialist oppression he understands 
Europe better, its social evils well hidden beneath a veneer of cultural and 
personal freedom (Nizan, 1973). Driven by feelings of solidarity, his journey to 
the Arab countries reveals how ‘naked power’ renders humans just as naked, and 
this is what interests him: beyond the linguistic, ethnic or political differences, he 
seeks human nudity, bare humanity, the others as his brothers or as himself 
(Allam, 1999). He sees the essence of European capitalism stripped of the thick 
philosophical veneer justifying its existence and, after laying bare the spiritual 
and existential poverty of economic and political domination, he returns to 
France determined to fight. In the final image of the book, with violent surrealist 
intensity, he sees the defeat of the dominators taking the form of soldiers in 
black jackets lying motionless on the ground, their arms stretched out, in the 
middle of a funereal Place de la Concorde.    
   This instinctive appreciation of social conflict is later sustained by theoretical 
considerations. Nizan criticizes Durkheim in a long endnote to his The 
Watchdogs, where functionalist sociology is described as an attempt to establish 
an artificial form of communion among people and pacify them, irrespective of 
the injustice they experience.  
 
‘Whether it be mathematics or collective representation, everything in 
Durkheim leads to social harmony. Bourgeois philosophy tries very hard 
to conceal the war raging throughout society, a war it does not dare 
declare – beneath the celestial veil of an imaginary peace, a peace it is 
incapable of establishing on earth’ (Nizan, 1971: 156). 
 
   In a critique of Henri-Louis Bergson (1911), he appreciates that the 
philosopher addresses the processes of immediate experience and attributes to 
these more significance than abstract rationalism and science for understanding 
reality. However, ne notes that, after promising to address the concreteness of 
nature and life, the celebrated philosopher ends up replacing immutable 
abstractions with new ones, giving the appearance of life to mystical objects and 
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substituting a vocabulary of movement for one of rest (Nizan, 1967). The 
watchdogs, in brief, are the professional guardians of the status quo, the 
intellectuals who never cease to protect and glorify a specific social group, 
usually their own. Such professional guardians may be pure metaphysicians, like 
Durkheim, or practical individuals such as judges. The latter sit in their sinister 
criminal courts, in domestic as well as in colonial territories, and keep 
sentencing rebels to death or to forced labour (Schalk, 1979). Nizan’s invective is 
primarily focused on philosophy, but his arguments extend to other academic 
disciplines, all in his view engaged in devising a very sophisticated set of 
principles and constructs supporting social stability. Some study philosophy, he 
remarks, without grasping the meaning and direction of what they are studying. 
Others may be vaguely motivated by the notion that philosophy involves ‘good 
intentions’ toward humanity, ‘and that through the pursuit of philosophy peace 
will spread among the men of good will’ (ibid: 67). Nizan contends that abstract 
knowledge, and for that matter intelligence, can be used both for and against 
mankind. They are ‘servants’ which can concentrate on eschatological truths or 
on concrete issues such as, for example, the incidence of tuberculosis in Paris. 
Philosophers who choose the first path might be endowed with elegance of 
argument, technical subtlety and high stylistic skills, but live apart from society, 
having freed themselves from the chains of locality. They are heads without 
bodies, and by abstaining from reality they become lighter than angels. While 
providing abstract definitions of liberty, and at the same time by claiming 
neutrality and abstention from choice, in fact they make a partisan choice, thus 
participating like everybody else in the impure actuality of their time.  
 
‘During WW1 they did what the generals told them to do, if they were too 
old to be mobilized, they followed with docility the ignorant popular 
movements and exhorted those who were mobilizable to die’ (ibid: 68).   
 
   Nizan urges students to stay away from these docile clercs of the bourgeoisie 
and not to wander on to the polished paths and frozen corridors of a spiritualist 
philosophy. However, he ardently believes in knowledge and intellectual activity, 
as his teaching and popular journalism testify. The public enemy N.1, in his view, 
is illiteracy. Culture, however, resembles medicine: it can cure or kill. And in the 
former case, it can help attain consciousness of the social reality, which in turn 
can assume an explosive value. Learning possesses a revolutionary significance, 
and the only obstacles preventing it from turning into a tool for genuine social 
transformation are erected by the watchdogs and their deceptive philosophizing.  
    
Conspiracy 
 
In Nizan’s most famous novel, The Conspiracy, a small group of young men of that 
awkward age between twenty and twenty-four decides to express its aversion to 
social injustice through the publication of a journal, Civil War, and to spread it 
along with their anger in the public domain. The plot is focused on the lives of 
five students, Rosenthal, Laforgue, Bloyé, Jurien and Pluvinage, and events take 
place between July 1928 and December 1929. Their ideas and projects are 
presented as no more than a series ‘of inconsequential gestures’ typifying the 
instability of young men in transition from childhood to manhood, ‘young men 
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whose dependent student status ultimately places them at the periphery of 
social activity and deprives them of seriousness and credibility’  (Scriven, 1988: 
151).  
  Rosenthal believes in the pedagogical properties of political and philosophical 
literature and is confident that a new journal will ignite the revolutionary spirit 
of the masses. Laforgue is seized by a desire to rebel against his own wealthy 
condition and sees society’s true contours masked behind the myths of freedom, 
religious creed and hypocritical brotherhood. He conspires against his own 
social class, and such an endogenous betrayal is described by Nizan (2011) as 
something that threatens bourgeois stability more fundamentally than any 
collective, oppositional, action. Contentious politics, for Nizan, is by now 
tolerated but ineffective, part of the ‘democratic’ process, a painless routine. 
Rosenthal and Laforgue share dreamy ideas and hopes, and their nobility lies in 
their will to subvert the system. Pluvinage, instead, is a man of action, but his 
feverish activism  ‘cannot but end badly, because he is basically concerned only 
with vengeance and believes in his destiny without any ironic reflection upon 
himself’ (ibid: 18). It is he who suggests that the front cover of Civil War should 
carry a machine-gun. 
    Sartre (1938: x) detects in some of these young men the fatal lightmindedness 
and the aggressive futility of those who have no duties and are by nature 
irresponsible. Nothing can really engage them, not even their membership of 
extremist parties: they are temporary diversions devoid of consequences, as they 
can ‘always return to the embrace of their class’. ‘Conspiring’ for them is a way of 
whispering, sharing little mysteries and inventing implausible dangers. Their 
tenuous intrigues amount to a game, a feverish but abortive game, a form of play-
acting whereby they lie to themselves while knowing they are running no risk.  
  The inclination of the group towards radicalism is not guided by love for 
humanity or any other mawkish philanthropic feeling, theirs being a natural 
impulse to revolt.  Humanitarianism, in their view, is tantamount to affectation, a 
thin veneer leading action nowhere. It is not cruelty and oppression they are 
fighting against, but idiocy, the prime quality of a declining, doomed, system.  
They are stirred by the dull logic of power more than by its crimes, and their 
fight is not for the workers, who definitively refrain from imitating them, but for 
themselves, although the working class is in their mind their natural ally.  
   Predestined victors of history, they embrace a philosophy of the inevitable, 
prefiguring a future stage in which society reaches harmony, shuns conflict and 
bans hypocrisy. Consequently, their mission consists of exposing mendacity, in 
an ambitious plan to extend Marx’s analyses of the fetishism of commodities to 
all dominant values and principles. Such an extension would construct a 
universal classification of deception (Redfern, 1972). A modern encyclopedia is 
what they envisage as their contribution to revolt, one which announces through 
clear expressive means the big lie embedded in the status quo, unsettles the 
smug agents of domination and prophesizes their demise. A Hegelian 
encyclopedia, theirs will, however, seek inspiration from Spinoza, his pantheism 
embracing in inclusive tolerance all genuine expressions of nature and humanity.  
 
‘People are suffocating inside shells of mendacity. We shall tell those 
hermit-crabs why they are dying. They’ll be furious with us, nobody like 
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truth for its own sake. But Marx said men must be given consciousness of 
themselves, even if they don’t want it’ (Nizan, 2011: 42).  
 
   This educative programme aims at infusing with an identity people who are 
dying without one, and includes a project of denigration addressed to all 
received ideas.  It amounts to profanation of what society holds dear: when 
victorious on a world scale, they will, like Lenin once said, use gold for the 
purpose of building public lavatories in the streets of some of the largest cities of 
the world. Nizan displays both denigration and sympathy for these young people, 
who are not yet aware of how formless the world is, and how hard it is to fight 
against a ‘gelatinous mass with neither head nor tail, a kind of enormous jellyfish 
with hidden organs’ (Scriven, 1988: 149). 
   After three months, Civil War enjoys the support of five hundred subscribers 
and eight hundred single-copy purchasers, while three publishing houses give 
the journal paid advertising. But revolution, they realize, requires more than 
articles, and radical change ‘can be measured only by the sacrifices one makes to 
it and the risks one runs for it’ (Nizan, 2011: 48). The reader feels that, finally, 
the group of young men starts planning practical, risky, action. But the plan is 
relatively tame. They set up a tiny network of industrial and military espionage, 
and Simon, an old friend who has joined the army, is asked to conspire with them 
by stealing the military defense plan for Paris, Area 2, which is locked in the 
barracks, a little cupboard, rather like the lockers in school dormitories. Simon 
obliges and rummages among the files marked with ‘confidential’ or ‘secret’, 
finding no difficulty in discovering the only important item, the defense plan for 
Area 2. It is a notebook which, with extreme baldness, evokes war, revolution, 
civil strife, and places troops, machine-guns and mortars in strategic city spots. 
Simon does not steal it but diligently copies its content and sends it to Rosenthal. 
When he is found out, he excuses himself by saying that he is fascinated by that 
material and intends to write a novel with it. 
   The spying activities, in brief, remain chimerical and fail to spark a militant 
action of sort, rather they signal the beginning of the end of the revolutionary 
cell. One of the boys commits suicide, and immediately afterwards Pluvinage is 
suspected by his associates to have reported to the police a generous gentleman 
who is hosting a member of the Communist Party on the run. When the evidence 
of the betrayal is undeniable, we learn that what really attracted Pluvinage to the 
group was the possibility of turning revolutionary ideas into illegal conduct, it 
was, therefore, the hidden, clandestine, nature of its project. His intense vocation 
for mystery, unfulfilled by subversive activity confined to the publication of a 
journal, can now be directed elsewhere: he suddenly sees himself destined for 
the religion of police work, the discipline of the Special Branch. ‘Some great idea 
must guide spies and informers, if they wish to survive. It is necessary for them 
to believe in the sacred character even of their treachery’ (ibid: 222).  
 
Active and passive nihilism 
 
Social movements scholars may view Paul Nizan’s conspiracy as an improbable 
example of collective action, as despite being based on an informal network of 
individuals and being engaged in conflict, it lacks the third key characteristic of 
social movements, namely the capacity to produce and being produced by 
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collective identity (Diani, 1992). There is no socio-economic homogeneity among 
Nizan’s conspirators, who posses a ‘weak’ identity and are constantly troubled 
by uncertainty: they aristocratically distance themselves from the social groups 
whose aspirations may share some aspects with theirs but, at the same time, 
identify the enemy of those groups as their own. They are able to shift from 
denigration of the idiocy of power to allegiance to its formally appointed 
guardians, as if being inured to conspire they found it easy to engage in 
conspiracy even against their peers and themselves. Criminologists may refer to 
relative deprivation and deviant adaptations, mobilize subcultural and conflict 
theory, or turn to symbolic interactionism to surmise how oppositional 
behaviours are constituted and enacted. Among them, some would focus on the 
‘stylized dynamics of threatening or illicit’ conduct and modes of resistance 
(Carrabine et al, 2002: 75). Focusing on cultural aspects, they would explicate 
the attractions of ‘doing wrong’, as marginality accompanied by transgression 
may be exciting, a thrilling experience far more exhilarating than conformism 
(Katz, 1988; Presdee, 2000; Ferrell, Hayward and Young, 2008). Illicit conspiracy 
can be located in everyday life, a site of drama, tragedy and joy, and captured as a 
holistic phenomenon, with ‘its adrenaline, its pleasure and panic, its excitement, 
and its anger, rage and humiliation, its desperation and its edgework’ (Young, 
2011: 84).  
   Rule-breaking, in this perspective, is seen as a way of manufacturing 
excitement, escaping boredom, feeling alive and expressing subjectivity. In 
embryonic form, this view is also detectable as early as the 1970s in the 
contribution of the new criminology, when Taylor, Walton and Young (1973: 
230) suggest that individuals and groups are totally ‘determined’ by social 
dynamics and constraints, but are able to react to criminal labels and produce 
subjective antagonistic behavior. Acts of deviance are described as acts of men in 
the process of actively making, rather than passively taking the external world. 
Several forms of deviance, including ‘vandalism, individual industrial sabotage 
and even some sex crime’, allude to subjective choices to challenge ‘the social 
structure and the structure of power’, but they retain at the same time a distinct 
hedonistic character (ibid: 271). Hedonism and sensual aesthetics return in Katz 
(1988), who includes violent behaviour among those illicit conducts replete with 
seductive significance. Playfulness and excitement, therefore, are seen as the 
basic traits of offending, which requires investment of energies and provides the 
sensation of living intensely (Cusson, 1983). Hyper consumerism is part of this 
sensation (Hayward, 2004), in that it gives the impression that, although illegally 
acquired, the avalanche of goods available can be enjoyed even by those who 
have limited possibilities of accessing the market.  
 
‘Moreover, hemmed in by the hyper-banalization of over-regulation, 
excluded from ever greater swathes of public and private space (from 
shopping malls to schools), the most comprehensively demonized youth 
are goaded into manufacturing excitement by conjuring up carnivals of 
crime’ (Downes and Rock, 2007: 143). 
 
   Sartre (1938: xii) maintains that Nizan’s is not a novelist’s style, sly and hidden, 
but a style of combat, a weapon. In The Conspiracy, however, combat consists of a 
merely abstract fight seducing those who limit themselves to planning it. In 
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Nizan’s novel there is no carnival of crime but of inaction, a contemplative 
posture adopted by the protagonists who seem satisfied with merely savouring 
their illicit purposes. The thrill for them is not produced by the illegal operations 
they carry out, rather, it stems from the illegality of the field in which they intend 
to operate, while their excitement is augmented by the incapacity to make 
decisions and to act consequently. Nizan’s (1973: 2) most celebrated sentence is 
‘I was twenty: I will not allow anyone to say it is the most beautiful age in life’, 
which conveys a mixed sense of hesitancy, impotence and unfulfilled desire. 
Criminologists who emphasize the stylistic, spectacular, cultural aspects of 
deviant acts may want to consider the seductive nature of inertia, 
procrastination, pessimistic indolence. Transgression, in sum, may just consist of 
metaphorically choosing one’s side of the barricades. But in what way can we 
interpret inaction as transgression? 
   One way could be to equate Nizan’s conspiracy and its inertia with a form of 
political oblomovism, as superbly incarnated in the novel by Ivan Goncharov 
(2005). Oblomov would answer ‘no’ to the question ‘to be or not to be?’, because 
incapable of making important decisions or undertaking any significant actions. 
The son of an upper middle class member of the Russian’s landed gentry, he 
raises lassitude and apathy to an art form; he conducts his daily business from 
his bed, and when he glances at his slippers he is horrified by the thought of 
extending his feet in their direction. If he calls his servant, who arrives panting in 
his bedroom, he forgets why he called him and after shouting ‘return to your 
room until I have remembered’ decides that oblivion is preferable. According to 
conventional interpretations, Oblomov personifies the ineptitude and 
uselessness of landowners in pre-industrial societies, where innovation and 
enterprise are discouraged. The novel is deemed a story of non-events, of 
physical and mental immobility, which are rendered subtly morbid by the slow, 
obsessive rhythm of the narrative. The main character, chained as he is to 
inaction, and engulfed in a spiritual paralysis, is said to be the emblem of a tragic 
and fascinating aspect of the Russian spirit, namely the reluctance to accept the 
throb of reality. Such reluctance is supposedly rooted in Oriental fatalism and in 
the typically Asian exaltation of the primacy of contemplation over action.  
   Another way of approaching inaction could be to praise it for its philosophical 
proximity to radical criticism of economic activity, a form of atheism addressed 
to the religion of incessant development. Nizan’s conspirators, in this sense, 
could be regarded as examples of subversive anti-productivity, critics of the 
concept of economic growth and the sanctity of labour. As Oblomov senses that 
by devoting his time to action he might only generate useless products and 
wealth, so Nizan’s characters find action repulsive because it does not change 
things. This leads us to another interpretation.  
   Nizan’s conspirators are conceptual figures, purveyors of skepticism and 
negative faith. They have lost interest in the world as it is, while perceiving their 
own inability to change it. Similar to Plato’s sophists, they can express one 
conviction with the same vehemence with which they support its opposite, and 
like for Hamlet their lack of a sense of self leads them to think of all potential 
identities as so many optional roles they can play (Cutrofello, 2014). There is no 
destructive power in their negation, and their revolutionary indecision, which 
initially contains failure but also potential, will stay with them until they 
succumb. The type of nihilism depicted by Nizan, in brief, is passive, because real 
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goals are lacking, as are responses to the real. This type of nihilism is 
symptomatic of the ‘innervation of the will’, and because it is impossible for ‘the 
will not to will’, the history of passive nihilism culminates ‘not in the cassation of 
the will but in a will to nothingness’ (ibid: 75).  
   Hesitation, however, may coincide with awaiting the decline of the dominant 
values before attempting the creation of new ones. It can be regarded as a 
strategic choice rather than equated to indecisiveness. Delaying or tarrying is 
characteristically philosophical, and taking one’s time is anti-rhetorical: 
‘Philosophers conduct their arguments in peace and at leisure […] Meanwhile, 
the man of rhetoric always has to speak under pressure of time; for the water 
clock hurries him forward’ (Chappell, 2005: 121). Expressing a similar opinion, 
Antonio Negri (2001) sees in the culture of grief and nothingness a form of 
action, a critique of dialectical thought which supposedly unites without 
generating innovation or ruptures. Delaying, therefore, may be revolutionary, as 
it hides the silent excavation and subterranean tunneling which, eventually, will 
allow for conflict to make a sudden appearance. It is what Marx (1996: 546) sees 
as the invisible preparatory work leading to the fateful rebellions of 1848, which 
he hails with the unforgettable: ‘Well grubbed, old mole!’. The mole may be 
delayed, but is bound to come to light. 
    Paul Nizan appears to confirm this view of inaction as transgression when he 
finds parallels between the age of Epicurus and his own. While in Plato’s time it 
is still possible, Nizan argues, to wish for the collective emancipation of society, 
during a period of debacle such as that witnessed by Epicurus (341-271 B.C.) one 
can only remain alone. In the oppressive and violent world experienced by 
Epicurus, the only possible salvation is that of the individual. Nizan emphasizes a 
similar doctrine of separation from society, using the word ‘secession’ to 
synthetize his views. A wise man will secede from active life, from ‘the savage 
struggles within the Athenian polis’ (Schalk, 1979: 70).  In this respect, ataraxia 
is the key condition, the state of undisturbed or unbothered soul, a kind of 
tranquility which is almost identical to pleasure, or to ‘thrilling excitement’, as it 
were. 
  
Suicide  
 
If the culture of nothingness may amount to a strategy of delay, how can we 
situate suicide in the political framework drawn by Paul Nizan? Positivist 
criminologists attribute to individualistic political offenders, like those portrayed 
by Nizan, a form of congenital criminality associated with vanity, megalomania 
and intermittent geniality. Mystical figures, they embrace a dogma and are 
capable of impressing their followers with acts which may cause their own 
death. In fact, they are happy to die (Lombroso, 1894; 1902; Lombroso and 
Laschi, 1890). Nihilists are seen as obsessed by the differences between the 
wealthy and the destitute, and regicides such as Luigi Lucheni, who murdered 
the Austrian Empress, are described as philanthropic killers who expect, in turn, 
to be killed.  
 
‘Lucheni thought he would be sentenced to death, and when he realized 
that in the region in which he was tried, the death penalty had been 
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abolished, he was extremely upset. He wrote to the president of the 
Republic asking to be sentenced’ (Lombroso, 1902: 223).  
 
Positivists, in sum, suggest that the true aim of conspirators is ‘indirect suicide’ 
(Ruggiero, 2006).  
    Decades later, the Black Panther Party develops this positivist notion in a 
somewhat surprising fashion. In December 1969, at 4.55 in the morning, the 
police raid an apartment in Chicago occupied by nine members of the party, 
including its chairman Fred Hampton. Heavy gunfight is heard, eight rounds or 
more, lasting over a period of ten minute. When it stops, two young men, Fred 
Hampton and Mark Clark, are dead, while other occupants of the premises are 
seriously injured (Wilkins and Clark, 1973). The officials responsible for 
planning the police operation and the officers executing it are said to have acted 
with wanton disregard for human life and the legal rights of American citizens. 
The wildly excessive use of gunfire seems more suited to a wartime military raid 
than the task of a search warrant. There is no shoot-out: the police do all the 
shooting and most of it blindly. Faced with this execution without trial, the 
Panthers feel that the range of options available to them is drastically narrowed 
and self-inflicted violence is one them. This is when Newton (1973: 4-5) 
distinguishes between reactionary and revolutionary suicide. The former is 
described as the reaction of persons who take their own life in response to social 
conditions that overwhelm them and condemn them to helplessness. There are 
many suicides among young black men, who have been ‘deprived of human 
dignity, crushed by oppressive forces, and denied their right to live as proud and 
free human beings’. At the heart of the concept of revolutionary suicide, 
conversely, there is the belief that ‘it is better to oppose the forces that would 
drive me to self-murder than to endure them’. Revolutionary suicide is, 
therefore, the price of self-respect, and does not imply a death wish. It entails its 
opposite. ‘We have such desire to live with hope and human dignity that 
existence without them is impossible’. One has to ‘move against’ the official 
forces inflicting death, even at the risk of death (Ruggiero, 2006: 124). 
   Contemporary suicide missions, in this sense, are not as new and unique as we 
might think: they have been enacted by those who feel that their ‘right of combat’ 
(to use a Durkheimian term) has been restricted to acts of self-injury. Self-
inflicted harm, then, represents the control and triumph over one’s fate when 
such fate is  being decided by others. Levinas (1987) argues that the distinctive 
feature of classical tragedy is the hero’s ability to commit suicide, as in the face of 
horrifying predicament, and when everything else fails, what rebels have got left 
is their power to die. In Durkheimian terms again, the suicide of one of Nizan’s 
conspirators is not of an ‘egoistic’ type, namely it does not signal low levels of 
integration in a social group nor lack of identification with collective life and 
social pursuits. On the contrary, it is ‘altruistic’ suicide, marking the bonds the 
conspirator believes to have established with its natural ally: the working class. 
Ultimately, it is hard to assimilate this ‘altruistic’ self-annihilation into the ‘thrill 
and seduction’ paradigm, as this form of extreme transgression, while creating 
and inhabiting a web of meaning, excludes hedonism and playfulness from the 
feelings of those performing it. To paraphrase and upturn Sartre’s observation 
that communists cannot write a good novel because they have no right to 
become accomplices of their characters, we might say that criminologists cannot 
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write good books unless they become complicit with the subjects they study, not 
only when they enact carnivals, but also when they commit suicide.  
  
Betrayal   
 
Betrayal can be regarded as a form of moral suicide and is the second option 
available to unsuccessful conspirators. Jean-Paul Sartre (1973) includes it among 
the manifestations of radical impotence that failed revolutionaries transmit to 
younger generations when, defeat after defeat, rather than their wisdom and the 
fruits of their experience, all they have to teach is their past mistakes.  
   Pulvinage is Nizan’s traitor and his father is chief clerk for burials in the 
Préfecture de la Seine. Close proximity to cemeteries, mortuaries and death 
compounds the deep sense of humiliation and resentment he harbours for his 
lowly social situation. As a student, he experiences both shame and inferiority in 
the presence of Rosenthal and Laforgue, who loaf in the superior social condition 
of their family. People like me are only capable of being loyal to winners, he 
confesses. Pluvinage, a loser by birth, cannot remain loyal to a party of losers 
(Scriven, 1988). 
   Pluvinage has a great classical precedent, a member of the ‘group of five’ in 
Dostoevsky’s (1971 [1872]) The Devils. The violent conspiracy of this group ends 
when Lyamshin locks himself up in his room for hours; he seems to attempt 
suicide, but does not succeed. He then rushes off to the police, crawling on his 
knees, sobs and shrieks, kisses the floor, crying that he is not worthy to kiss the 
boots of the high officials who stand before him. They calm him down and speak 
nicely to him. He tells them everything, absolutely everything: all the facts, all he 
knows, anticipating their questions, giving them information about things in 
which they are not interested and they would never have thought of asking him. 
The thrill he has long associated with the clandestine activity of his group 
returns now in his conspiracy against his former conspiracy partners.  
   Albert Camus (1981) turns betrayal into an act of violence which purportedly 
erases the violence previously perpetrated by revolutionaries and missionaries 
alike. He highlights the continuity in the core attitude of conspirators in spite of 
their apparent drastic shift. In L’Exil et le Royame, the Renegade, a former 
missionary, undertakes to convert with violence a notoriously cruel people. He is 
instead converted by them. When he hears the news that a new missionary is to 
arrive, the Renegade steals a gun and waits in ambush to murder him. In his 
symmetrical behavior, he has not changed. The thrill experienced in the previous 
allegiance turns into the thrill to cause harm to those who continue to be 
seduced by their own transgression. Seductive, in this case, is desistance from 
previous acts, a return to ‘normality’ or conformism. Criminologists emphasizing 
culture, therefore, may want to explore the thrill provoked by desistance, the 
passionate subjection experienced by Pluvinage, Lyamshin and the Renegate as a 
novel form of transgression. 
 
   The criminological literature on desistance only partly and rarely captures this 
mechanism, and when it does it attributes a crucial role to the variable 
‘imagination’. A ‘respectability package’ is referred to as a major influence on 
offenders’ desistance, a package formed of job stability and marriage (Giordano, 
Cernkovich and Rudolph, 2002). Other key personal resources cited in the 
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process are cognitive skills (Paternoster and Pogarsky, 2009), self-mastery 
(Maruna, 2001) and the ability to form high-quality social bonds (Laub and 
Sampson, 2001). Often associated with personal determination gained through 
family ties, desistance from crime is also linked to more general forms of social 
capital (Coleman, 1988) and to religious affiliation (Adorjian, 2012). In other 
contributions, the situational coping mechanisms are investigated used by 
desisters to overcome barriers to change and achieve meaningful lives. The self, 
it is suggested, emerges from a sense of temporal continuity between the past, 
the present and the future, and as humans possess a strong future orientation, 
they strive to understand the ‘wherefore’, namely the potential trajectory of their 
lives. In this sense, ‘the desistance process is also characterized by the active 
pursuit of a desired future self’ (Healy, 2014: 874). Ex-offenders, therefore, must 
experience an internal shift which prepares them for change, and this is 
determined by the presence of new social networks opening up to them which 
promise the construction of a new identity. This shift may be simultaneous with 
an experience of ‘emotional mellowing’, which reduces the attractiveness of 
crime and enhances the ability to manage emotions (Giordano, Schroeder and 
Cernkovic, 2007). Desisters, on the other hand, may adopt a redemptive attitude 
and display the wisdom they have acquired through their past experiences, but 
in order to do so they have to ‘imagine’ themselves as new individuals. This new 
image of themselves may take shape even during incarceration, which limits the 
offenders’ ability to creatively build a non-deviant identity. In this case, the event 
of incarceration has to be viewed as a transformative period leading them to 
desistance form criminal activity (Soyer, 2014). The thrill of conformism, in 
other words, may also be experienced while in custody: ‘Despite evidence to the 
contrary, narratives of current and former prisoners emphasize the deterrent 
effect of incarceration and describe their experiences in prison as motivation to 
turn your life around’ (ibid: 91). Although imprisonment is unlikely to create 
opportunities for positive change, inmates end up ‘imagining’ their future self as 
conformist individuals. Subjection and conformism, in them, cause the same 
thrill experienced by Pluvinage, Lyamshin and the Renegate. 
    
   Paul Nizan is obsessively loyal to his Party and eulogizes his membership as the 
only option open to him as an intellectual. His journalism is an act of communist 
militancy and when, in The Conspiracy, we encounter a member of the Party who 
is wanted by the police generously hidden by a benefactor in his house, we feel 
that the relationship between the two is not comparable to that the man on the 
run has with his fellow party activists. His comrades are closer to him even when 
they are far away, because ‘Party loyalties are more powerful than the loyalties 
of death and blood’ (Schalk, 1979: 54). Nizan, however, leaves the Party in 1939, 
when the Nazi-Soviet pact is established, and when in his view nobler coalitions 
could have been forged. He is against forming a united front with anybody who 
comes along, and even when the Party joins the large Popular Front alliance, he 
remains skeptical about cooperating with the Catholic Left. The doctrinal 
differences between the two groups are, in his view, ‘irreducible’. 
   Perhaps, unlike André Breton, his dreams are not populated by hordes of 
Cossacks on their horses occupying Place de la Concorde, but still believes that 
the French should fight alongside the Soviet army to defeat fascism, hence his 
‘impossible communism’. He cannot accept that the prosaic struggle of the 
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Popular Front erases from the political agenda the scenario of social revolution. 
And it is for this reason that the Party brands him as a traitor and a coward, 
trying to undermine his reputation and, later, to oblitarate his memory 
completely. ‘The communists’, writes Sartre (1973: 8), ‘do not believe in Hell; 
they believe in nothingness’. Nizan’s decision to distance himself from the Party 
is difficult and painful, as Sartre comments, and the existential void produced in 
him only ends with death just a year after his defection. But, as a cruel 
insinuation has it, his vivid description of betrayal is due to his being a traitor 
himself.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Crime may cause joy, excitement and pleasure, and even violence may be morally 
and aesthetically motivated: actions that would be wrong in one culture are right 
and even obligatory in others (Fiske and Rai, 2015). Such actions can be 
regarded as ‘virtuous’ in that they constitute and perpetuate social relationships 
and identities while cementing amicable bonds. Cultural analyses of deviance 
and crime contain a phenomenological element, in the sense that the events 
described appear to take shape in the heads of real individuals in specific 
moments in time, individuals who through action constitute and ground their 
own life world.  Action is spontaneous, creative, the result of vitalism, a life-force 
which is at the core of human existence, led by incessant desire and affect. 
Events, therefore, can only be captured as meanings which make sense in the 
face of what Husserl (1931) describes as the things around us dancing like 
shadows. Affect as feeling, emotion or yearning is bound to lead to action which, 
while consolidating a notion of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, we can assume, will create 
forms of collective identity and genuine amity. From a Weberian perspective, we 
may infer that the cultural study of crime expresses an implicit refusal of 
naturalism and advocates an interpretative understanding of the subjective 
experience of social actors. Looking at the meaning actors give to themselves is 
indeed a cultural enterprise and rejects ‘neutral’ observation supposedly 
conducted by natural scientists. Schutz (1963) may not be the founder of cultural 
criminology, but his arguments show some assonance with this criminological 
version of vitalism. The world of nature, as explored by natural scientists, does 
not mean much to the molecules and atoms forming it. The reality as observed 
by the social scientist, conversely, has meaning and relevance for those who live, 
act and think in it.  
   The life world and the life-force presented by Paul Nizan in The Conspiracy 
bring to light a variety of aspects which require further cultural exploration. 
Conspiracy is thrilling, but contemplative, and its deviant nature may well reside 
in a plan, an exhilarating plot that will never be put in place. The prospect of 
eventually or potentially committing crime can suffice for those seduced by 
illegality. Their pleasure may be the mere result of an aesthetic admiration of 
imaginary crimes.  Inaction, but even apathy, therefore, deserve equal analytical 
efforts for their role in promoting or hampering criminal activity. Inaction, 
however, may resemble a Marxist mole, which restrains life-force while digging 
tunnels and building opportunities for future outbursts. A culture of nothingness, 
as we have seen, characterizes passive nihilism, but as Negri suggests can 
disguise radical alterity. In Nizan’s novel we also find that radicalism, on the 
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other hand, can be expressed through suicide, in its turn deserving of specific 
cultural analysis, although a thanatological element is required within the 
vitalism of current analyses. The deviance of Nizan’s conspirators does not 
cement amity but inspires the infliction of harm upon envied, competing, friends. 
Finally, defection, betrayal and, in criminological terms, desistance are crucial 
manifestations of thrilling experiences and the excitement they cause is as 
relevant as that generated by deviant festivals and carnivals.  
   In sum, cultural analyses of crime may look at the work of Paul Nizan and 
enrich its arguments through the appreciation and assimilation of his counter-
arguments.  
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